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Silent Parties: A Problem for Liberalism?
Liberalism is often under attack because of its alleged excessive "formalism". In the words of one of its
main contemporary defenders, "the defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental
freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how
they lead their lives".1 In more continental language, this core idea has been summarized in the statement
that what liberalism is all about is "the handling and organization of the conditions in which freedom can
be realized".2 For liberals, individuals must be recognized as the ultimate arbiters of what gives value to
their own existences, and the liberal principle of legitimacy is not satified whenever the state seeks to
impose any particular comprehensive doctrine about the good life.
From many sides, however, it is said that an acceptable society in which to live needs a more
substantial conception of the good, without which individuals are uprooted and anonymous.3
Somewhat along the lines of the traditional criticism of the Kantian doctrine, turning upon its focus
on procedure and universalism to the detriment of content and particularism, contemporary
liberalism is sometimes seen as an empty morality that, abstracting as it does from experience, is
not able to provide the ethical resources necessary to ground acceptable pragmatic policies.4 I want
to argue instead that, at least from one point of view, liberalism in all its versions is not formal
enough. There is, I will claim, a specific problem with respect to which an important substantive
aspect is surreptitiously introduced into the theory: the problem of moral status. As my argument
unfolds, I shall deal with three different senses of "formal": formal as procedural, formal as neutral,
and formal as analytic.
I.
Moral status has been generally discussed within ethics rather than within political theory. But
contemporary political theory has an ethical basis, and, accordingly, it cannot fail to reckon with
one of the most basic problems in moral philosophy. The notion of moral status is employed to
shed light on specific answers to the question, which beings should have their interests protected,
and to what degree? Every ethical approach includes -- or presupposes -- a theory of moral status,
which is an essential part of value theory.5 At the center of ethics lies a set of norms to govern
behavior towards (at least some) other entities. Obviously, rules of behavior can only be addressed
to moral agents. Moral agents are those beings who can reflect morally on how to act, and whose
behavior can as a consequence be subject to moral evaluation. On the other hand, asking which are
the entities that should have their interests protected, is tantamount to asking who is a moral patient.
If the moral agent is a being whose behavior may be subject to moral evaluation, the moral patient
is a being whose treatment may be subject to moral evaluation. Moral patients are the others of the
golden rule, "treat others as you would have them treat you". They are the beings who should be
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taken into account when deciding how to act (of course, moral agents too are moral patients, when
they are, so to speak, at the "recipient" end of the action). It is apparent that not all beings are
necessarily moral patients. Depending on the selected criterion, a greater or smaller number of
entities will be excluded from moral consideration. Such entities have zero-grade moral status, and,
with them, one can do as one pleases: they are means to others' ends, or, at best, objects of
indifference.
Usually, in political theory, the problem of moral status -- with the attendant question of a clear
definition and consistent application of criteria for inclusion in, and possible relative ranking within,
the moral community -- is simply set aside, in favor of a quite abstract perspective. Political
philosophers, that is, merely take for granted that human beings make up a homogeneous
constituency, and depict them as equally endowed with one or more characteristics traditionally
considered as morally relevant. They tend to see all human beings as free and rational moral agents,
possessing the ability to regulate and guide their lives in accordance with some overall conception
of the good.6 If one employs such an abstract approach, and keeps inserting relative equality among
human beings within the normal background conditions of a liberal society, it is then easy to
translate surreptitiously the key notion of liberalism, that of "individual", into the more demanding
notion of "rational moral individual", or "person".7 The result is what has been aptly called the
agent/patient parity principle: the class of moral patients exactly coincides with the class of moral
agents.
To explore the implications of this view, I shall follow Thomas Nagel's political approach as
developed in his discussion of equality and partiality.8 According to Nagel, the problem of
reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual arises as a
problem about a division in each individual9 between two standpoints, the personal and the
impersonal, where the latter represents the claims of the collectivity. At a first stage, the basic
insight that appears from the impersonal standpoint is that everyone's basic interests matter, and no
one is more important than anyone else: "for a given quantity of whatever it is that's good or bad --
suffering or happiness or fulfillment or frustration -- its intrinsic impersonal value doesn't depend on
whose it is".10 In political theory, Nagel argues, the aim is to externalize through social institutions
the most impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint.11 Liberalism takes various forms, but
they all include a system of individual rights against interferences of certain kinds -- and we should
think of these fundamental guarantees as deriving from the requirements of legitimacy, that is,
"unanimous acceptability of the basic framework by typically divided individuals".12 The procedural
focus of the state, therefore, expresses itself in securing the impartial protection of individuals from
murder, torture, enslavement and other unauthorized touchings of themselves -- the impartial
protection, that is, of the basic interests of individuals in life, freedom, and welfare.
Ideally, in this moral division of labor, the bulk of impartial values is to be realized by background
institutions, leaving individuals relatively free to pursue their own values in their specific plans of
life. In particular, it is the constitution which is charged with embodying those basic rights against
interference that are to be insulated against the effects of biases and parochial interests and that, at
the same time, preserve for each individual a private area in which she can develop her conception
of how to live (recall the twofold nature of Mill's principle as "harm principle" and as "principle of
liberty").13 In political morality, however, there are not only these two extremities -- (near) absolute
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side-constraints and (near) absolute freedom. In political morality as contrasted to individual
morality, in fact, there is also an intermediate area which falls within the reach of ordinary political
bargaining and the calculus of interests. In this area, individuals living in a state that meets the
requirements of legitimacy are bound to accept the results of democratic decision-making, be they
derived from voting according to the majority rule or from institutionally reached compromise. We
are then left with at least three spheres: the basic, or constitutional, one, where generalized
prohibitions prevent basic individual interests from being infringed to achieve direct advantages or
to produce a greater overall balance of societal good; a middle grey area, that we can call political,
where certain infringements of non-basic interests are admitted even against the (or some)
individuals' will; and, finally, the private sphere of "free space" where individuals are sovereign,
and where their lives can be led as they choose.
The boundaries between the three areas are, as it would be expected, sometimes fuzzy, and many
controversies arise about whether a particular issue falls here or there. In particular, since virtually
every act one does affects others, even if only in trivial ways, there has been much discussion about
the correct construal of what constitutes "harm to others" and about the attending delimitation of the
private sphere. Examples include the interpretation of certain particular instances of freedom of
expression, owing to their possible detrimental influence on people's behavior, and the
interpretation of so-called "right to privacy", which conservatives tend to refer to collective units
rather than to individuals in order to regulate them.14 All this does not prevent, however, there
being issues that are clearly situated -- like, e.g., the injunction against murder or enslavement in the
first area, the level of taxation in the second one, and the choice of one's religion in the third one.
In what sense is it said that this overall structure is procedural rather than substantive? The basic
idea seems to be that side-constraints act as procedural indications which merely set a general
framework within which the goals are individually chosen. A legitimate state, that is, should not
offer a view of the good life -- it should confine itself to respect/guarantee the possibility for any
and all individuals to pursue their aims. Not only should it not directly force people along any
particular path, it should also, so to speak, patrol the territory in order to avoid the possibility of
some individuals coercing others.
It is apparent that such a description does not fit the whole functioning of contemporary liberal
societies. In what we have called the intermediate area, political bargaining normally produces at
least an outline of a theory of the good. The so-called welfare state is a good example: in this case,
a society opts for the view that it is possible to take something from the better-off in order to give
something to the worse-off -- it opts, that is, for the view that a society in which the weak receive
some help is better than a society in which the strong can enjoy their wealth fully undisturbed. Such
choices, however, cannot affect the first sphere. No one thinks that it would be possible to make
trade-offs between, e.g., welfare and basic protection -- for example by killing some people in order
to re-distribute their wealth. In fact, rights as embodied in the constitutions tend to be used "as a
test of the legality of the legislation", preventing the fundamental freedoms of the minority from
being infringed by specific worldviews of the majority.15
Let's describe the situation in a more abstract way. In sphere A, the first one, moral patients are
protected from state or other individuals' interference by fundamental rights: a fence is erected
around the basic interests of individuals. In sphere B, the second one, moral patients are somehow
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interfered with: non-basic interests of individuals can be sacrificed on the basis of agreed
proceedings. Finally, in sphere C, the third one, no other party is in question; no interests of moral
patients are involved, as moral agents freely act without impinging on any other individual's life.16
The aspiration to formality of liberalism concerns therefore area A -- the sphere of basic interests. In
this case, institutionalized side-constraints on the behavior of moral agents are confined to the role
of leaving individuals alone -- provided that they do the same with respect to others -- and do not
force upon them any particular worldview. In area B, basic interests are not involved, and therefore
particular worldviews emerge from political bargaining. In area C, no others' interests are touched.
Similarly to what happens -- though with a different emphasis -- regarding the problem of the
notion of "harm to other", debates about the formal nature of liberalism normally involve area C,
due to a loose construal of basic interests. For example, advocates of what was once called "the
enforcement of morals" and is now more aptly dubbed "moral environmentalism"17 claim that there
are behaviors which violate interests though they do not directly involve other individuals -- a
classical example is offered by particular sexual choices. Defenders of liberalism, however, do not
accept such a wide construal of basic interests. They plausibly argue that, on the one hand, sexual
freedom, being an integral part of individual freedom, is just the sort of interest which must be seen
as basic, and which should therefore be constitutionally protected; and that, on the other hand, the
"offence" caused to the sexual puritan by the relaxation of ambient taboos, arising as it does from
external preferences about how others should behave, typically involves a non-basic interest which
must be discounted, being just an instance of those attempts to force a specific comprehensive
doctrine on individuals that the liberal doctrine condemns. Thus, Thomas Nagel maintains that the
freedom to act on one's personal sexual desires being a leading candidate for institutional protection
as a right, a liberal society should decide in favor of such freedom, and against the (however deep)
individual convictions about how others should live.18
II.
There is, however, a different kind of situation in which a like response is advanced by defenders of
liberalism -- and this time, I shall argue, with less plausibility. I shall start from a widely known --
but by no means unique -- instance: the question of abortion. What do liberals most commonly say
in this regard? A widespread claim, in the case of abortion, seems to be that no particular view
should be imposed on individuals -- which amounts to allowing abortion, so that those who want to
practice it may do it, while opponents will continue avoiding it. For instance, in a book devoted to
the topic, Ronald Dworkin argues that the abortion debate is actually a debate about the sacredness
of human life in which one party (the pro-life movement) grants more weight to the natural
investment, that is, God's or nature's biological intervention, and the other (the pro-choice
movement) stresses instead the human investment, that is, the interest people have in the lives of
their loved ones; and, from this factual interpretation, he seemingly draws a normative
recommendation about how liberal societies ought to view abortion -- namely, that they should be
permissive about it. Also, in a recent article, John Rawls states that opponents to abortion may
present an argument in public reason for not granting a right to abortion; but, if they fail to win a
majority, since they need not themselves exercise the involved right, they can recognise it as
belonging to legitimate law, and forceful resistance as unreasonable.19
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Apparently, on these views, what is at issue in the abortion dilemma is merely a disagreement in
worldviews between citizens -- and, as such, a personal question of individual conscience. The
normative conclusion is therefore that the law should not take sides -- or, more strongly, that it
should decide in favor of freedom. This means to say that the question of abortion falls in area C,
that is, that in abortion no interests of others are involved. But this is simply question begging. As
it has been stressed within the context of bioethical discussions, "the dispute about abortion is,
largely, a dispute about whether or not abortion does have a 'victim'" -- whether, that is, there is or
there is not another party involved -- and, as a consequence, one cannot simply ignore it on the
grounds that people should not attempt to force others to follow their own moral views.20 It seems
plausible to hold that, by simply ignoring the possibility that the fetus is another party with a moral
status of its own, the conclusion defended by Dworkin and Rawls fails as a normative theory.
But the claim that what is in question in the abortion issue is merely a disagreement in worldviews
between citizens seems to fail as an empirical description as well. For such an approach is not the
model that prevails within liberal societies. If, in fact, abortion were seen as obviously falling in
area C -- if, that is, our societies on the whole opted for the view that, as far as abortion is
concerned, there definitely are no other parties' interests involved -- no distinctions would be traced
between early and late abortions. Such distinctions somehow express the widespread idea -- which
is also defended by many bioethicists -- that the problem of the moral status of unborn human
beings is not a single issue, but one that should be split at least into two parts: the question of the
status of the human sentient fetus (as in late abortions), and the question of the status of the embryo
and the human non-sentient fetus (as in early abortions). In this latter case, some liberal authors do
defend the idea that society should "take sides", as Will Kymlicka does when, with reference to the
issue of embryo experimentation, he suggests the pursuit of a convergence in government
commissions.21 In the light both of these difficulties and of the fact that abortion is a profoundly
dividing issue, liberal societies are inclined to settle the matter through leaving it to be decided by
some sort of political bargaining. What wins, therefore, is usually the majority's opinion, as
expressed either directly by the voters, or indirectly by the political prevalence of one of the two
confronting sides. Within such a framework, one can conclude that the issue of (both early and late)
abortion tends to be seen as pertaining to area B. This corresponds to saying that, in the abortion
issue, a) there are (at least sometimes) other parties' interests involved, and b) such interests are not
basic because, were they so, they would be protected by being inserted in area A.22 So, we seem to
have other parties who have non-basic interests, while apparently lacking basic interests.
The question of abortion is not the only one in which this paradox arises. Another -- and a very
prominent one -- is the question of the treatment of the members of other-than-human species. What
is, in this case, the standard liberal view? In the (uncommon) cases in which they directly confront
the status of nonhuman beings, liberal authors advance, albeit in an scarcely articulated way, the
suggestion that animals, though they are indeed other parties, should not be covered by
institutionalized side-constraints -- an idea presumably influenced by the previous, more extreme
view according to which legislation concerning animals falls within the so-called "crimes without
victims". Joel Feinberg offers a good example of the way this suggestion is formulated when he
states that "kindness and 'humanity'", while not sufficient for human beings, are "sufficient to
satisfy the rights of animals".23 Such words almost literally echo John Rawls's view that, while
humans are owed equal justice, we can only have duties of compassion and humanity towards
animals.24 This appears tantamount to saying that in the case of nonhumans as well we find other
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parties who have non-basic interests while lacking those basic interests which should be protected
by being inserted in area A.
It is easy to see why the paradox arises. If, in fact, human sentient fetuses and the member of other
species were ceteris paribus recognized to have basic interests to be placed in area A, without
changing the ways in which it is permissible to treat them, the structure of the area would be
transformed. To put all this more formally, we can imagine area A as a field of forces that represent
individual basic interests, and that are governed by procedural principles which both protect them
and curb them, by compelling them, so to speak, to run in parallel in order to avoid mutual
interference. It is clear that if some of the included forces were granted the possibility of doing as
they please with other included forces the idea of a pure procedural framework would collapse. As a
consequence, the interests of the disadvantaged beings cannot be inserted, lest the procedural core of
liberalism be undermined.
Is there a possibility of avoiding the paradox? The only way that seems open, and the one that
contemporary liberalism has actually opted for, lies in claiming that the interests in question can be
discounted -- that is, can be excluded from area A -- not because they are non-basic interests, but
because the individuals who bear them can be discounted. This would somehow save the previous
distinction, with area B including non-basic interests of, let's call them, basic individuals, and basic
interests of non-basic individuals.
It is, however, apparent that liberals cannot ground the view that the individual bearers of the
interests involved are second-class individuals, or non-standard parties, without putting once again
formality at risk, albeit in a different sense -- a sense which has to do with liberal neutrality. For by
confining the side-constraints characterizing area A to some parties, one merely pushes the problem
onto a higher level. If a liberal state should be neutral in the sense of avoiding perfectionism in
evaluating the merits of competing conceptions of the good life, it should be also neutral in the
sense of avoiding perfectionism in evaluating the comparative moral status of individuals.25 But by
granting protection only to some individuals, and leaving other individuals more or less at their
mercy -- insofar as non-standard parties' interests will always be overridden by the interests of
standard parties -- contemporary liberal theory breaks the moral community into two constituencies
which are hierarchically arranged, and it attributes differential value to individuals. Hence, far from
merely providing general, formal conditions for morality, it advances a substantive and specific
interpretation of it, thus giving up neutrality among individuals.
III.
Against the claim that the subdivision of the moral community into two levels which is required to
save the liberal claim to formalism invalidates such a claim at a higher level, thus disclosing the
substantive nature of present liberal theory, one might advance a rejoinder. The moral community,
one might say, is one thing; what we may call the "political community" is something else
altogether. This reply, which is somewhat reminiscent of the interpretation of justice as an artificial
virtue,26 and of the distinction between natural and what we may call "institutional" duties,27 is
deeply rooted in the history of political philosophy, and in particular in the social contract tradition.
Following Rawls, it could be roughly summarized as follows. Political philosophy is a separate and
narrower subject than ethics, because it must regulate the relations through common political
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institutions among persons who hold a plurality of comprehensive moral views. On this account,
political society, unlike more or less natural communities, is a sort of artifact -- a cooperative
enterprise whose creation and maintenance depends on the coordinated work of its parties. To create
and to maintain such enterprise, one must have some specific cognitive characteristics -- remember
the construal of all human beings as free and rational moral agents, endowed with the ability to
regulate and guide their lives in accordance with principles. Simply, those who do not contribute to
the enterprise are not accorded the advantages it confers.28
The reply is surprising, however. If, as liberalism argued since its dawn, states are instituted, mainly
and primarily, to secure the individuals' interest in basic protection from interference, what have
specific cognitive skills to do with such interest? Granted, specific cognitive skills are required to
vote, to represent other members of the community, to exercise freedom of speech or of religion.
But can a theory still be considered liberal when, as Rawls suggested, it entrusts life-and-death
decisions regarding certain individuals to the plurality of “comprehensive” moral views? Are
liberals justified in maintaining that individuals who cannot understand, for example, what voting
is, may be deprived of basic moral protection? Isn't this an unwarranted inference?
If it is, one can plausibly argue that what made it go unnoticed cannot be anything but the
surreptitious move we have noted at the outset -- that is, the translation of the key notion of
liberalism, that of "individual", into the more demanding notion of "rational moral individual", or
"person". Though endowed with an important history within moral philosophy, the notion of person
was easily appropriated by political philosophy just because, among its several interpretations, one
corresponded well to the particular sort of party that liberal authors had, and still have, in mind. The
apparently harmless steps are the following: to be a party in political society an individual should be
a rational moral agent; rational moral agents are called persons; to be a party to political society one
should be a person. What is the result of such a translation? Because "person" is also normally used
to mean "individual", what this particular instance of transitivity achieves is to conceal the
substantive nature of its notion of individual. The requisite of rational moral agency is, so to speak,
only hinted at, and such phrases as "all persons are equal" or "personal freedom" sound as if they
really covered all members of the society.
But, in contrast with what the abstract approach of political philosophers suggests, it is clear that
human societies do not include only "persons". It is undeniable that our communities include adult
human beings who, on account of structural problems due to genetic or developmental anomalies, or
of contingent problems due to diseases or accidents, will never acquire, or have forever lost, the
characteristics that we consider as typical of persons -- the brain-damaged, the severely
intellectually disabled, the irreversibly senile. What is our position with reference to these non-
paradigmatic humans? Do we hold either that our "personal" freedom includes the possibility to do
with them as we please (area C), or that decisions about their basic interests can fall within the
reach of ordinary political bargaining (area B)? We do not. In other words, we believe that
institutionalized side-constraints -- the procedural aspects of the state organization that express
themselves in securing the individuals' impartial protection -- apply to them too. Though non-
paradigmatic humans may have a reduced capacity for independent living, we think they should be
fully assimilated into the wider society.
Why do we think so? Because, I hold, we correctly see that the liberal notion of individual cannot
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be validly translated into the notion of "rational moral agent". If one wants to avoid substantivity --
that is, once again, if one wants to remain formal -- the definition of individual should be, so to
speak, analytically true. And if one starts from the central idea of liberalism, the idea of freedom, it
is unwarranted to conceive of it in terms of the Kantian "freedom of the will"29 rather than in terms
of the less demanding notion of "freedom of choice". The only analytic definition of individual is
not that of a rational moral agent, but that of a chooser -- a being who can exhibit a series of
attitudes ranging from deliberated decisions to, in the words of American philosopher Gregory
Vlastos, those "subtler modulations and more spontaneous expressions of individual preference"30
which could scarcely be called decisions. And this because, as it has been aptly noticed, what
liberals value is not (a certain sort of) freedom for its own sake, but rather the individuals' own
goals, which are the most important things in their lives.31 In other words, in order to be able to
enjoy freedom, an individual merely needs to possess those mental and physical abilities which
enable her to have goals and to pursue them.
IV.
Where does this leave one with respect to human sentient fetuses and nonhuman animals? What
kind of modifications should liberalism embody to avoid the surreptitious introduction of
substantivity that the passage from the individual conceived as chooser to the individual conceived
as a rational moral agent implies? At this point, the situations of human sentient fetuses and of
nonhuman animals part company. Many nonhuman animals are certainly choosers: they clearly
evince their preferences, and actively pursue their goals.32 As a consequence, their basic treatment -
- inclusive of the protection of life, freedom and welfare -- should be removed both from mere
'personal' choice (area C) and from majoritarian politics (area B), and should instead be submitted
to institutional side-constraints (area A).33
The situation is different and much more controversial as regards human sentient fetuses. Can we
see them as choosers? Notice that all revolves around this point. For, though a recent strand of
bioethical thought tends to grant an interest in (and accordingly a right to) life only to those beings
who are self-aware, we can here ignore this stance, since liberalism does not appeal to such
nuanced differences, but revolves instead around a single, categorical core concept. Is this core
concept applicable to human sentient fetuses? Well, no and yes. No, if we see choice as a notion
directly connected to action, insofar as such beings obviously have no possibility of engaging in the
pursuit of their goals. Yes, if we see choice as a notion which includes more passive aspects, like
the mere exhibition of pro- or con-attitudes. Of the two answers, the latter seems more consistent
with the present treatment of the most profoundly disabled among the non-paradigmatic humans we
mentioned before, who, as far as agency is concerned, are apparently in the same boat as sentient
fetuses.34 If we opt for this alternative, we should remove late abortions from area B, and insert
instead their prima facie prohibition in area A. The proviso "prima facie" is needed in the light of
the particular fact that the late abortion situation is quintessentially a case of conflict -- the conflict
between the mother's interests and the unborn's interests -- and such a peculiar, radical conflict
should make room for some further assessments of the situation.35
In the face of these considerations, a question seems naturally to arise: why do liberal societies
actually behave quite differently in the three instances we have considered? Why, that is, are
profoundly intellectually disabled humans as institutionally protected as any normal human being,
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while on the one hand, nonhuman animals, and, on the other, human sentient fetuses are commonly
handed over to the outcomes of majoritarian politics? I suggest that, behind these different
standards, lies a theoretical attitude which is older than liberalism, and which liberalism is at pains
to free itself from, but which always turns up again like a bad penny.
Put very roughly, what we can discover here is the influence of that contractarianism of Hobbesian
descent according to which it must be mutually advantageous for individuals to accept conventions
that recognize and protect each other's interests. Such a doctrine includes within the factors that
should be taken into consideration in order to build an organized society what we might call the
"threatening power" of the possible parties, thus excluding a priori those beings lacking any
capacity for retaliation, or even self-assertion. While in the crudest versions of contract-based
doctrines the reference is to physical power, as far as most contemporary agreement-based theories
are concerned, a weakened and revised version of threatening power can be clearly recognized in
the ability to speak out for oneself. A further step is the possibility of having someone who speaks
out on one's behalf.36
The importance, both actual and metaphorical, granted to the fact of speaking out can be traced in
many areas of moral and political reflection. In general, the centrality of the capacity for language
among criteria for (full) moral status in most mainstream western philosophy is connected to the
question of the cognitive skills it may be a mark of. I will not, however, enter here into the details
of this particular aspect and of the attendant discussions.37 What is relevant in this context is
instead the connection that can be established between the possession of language and the ability to
assert one's interests it confers. Such a connection, which is normally present in a more or less
implicit way, becomes in some instances particularly evident. An especially obvious example is the
case of the avowed centrality of verbal capacities in the so called discourse ethics, apropos of which
one of its main upholders, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, openly admits that it has
difficulties in dealing with the vulnerability of the "dumb creature".38 Another example is the
significance often attributed to the ability to claim something, as demonstrated e.g., within the
general debate on rights, by that "choice theory" which -- in contrast with the "interest theory"
grounding rights in the benefit one derives from them -- openly connects the possession of a right to
the power to assert it.39 This theoretical aspect finds a clear parallel in the social fact, emphasized
by authors dealing with the sociology of law, that the recognition of rights actually requires some
sort of force and imposition.
It is worth stressing that such force and imposition should not necessarily come directly from those
who aspire to rights. They may come instead from different, enlightened and more powerful groups
which can make their voice heard on behalf of other silent parties. As it has been observed, "a form
of strength which is anything but negligible is represented by cultural factors such as the ethical
values accepted by a substantial part of the community . . . which is capable of imposing its
values".40 This is just what happened, after centuries of moral and political dismissal, in the case of
profoundly intellectually disabled human beings: overcoming indifference and opposition, someone
powerful enough spoke out for them, and, starting from the 1960s, a series of international
declarations on their rights were issued.41 This is, however, what -- perhaps due to the invisibility
of the entities involved -- has not actually happened in the case of human sentient fetuses, despite
the analogies between them and some among these non-paradigmatic human beings. All the more
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so, this is what has not happened in the case of those nonhuman animals who are clearly choosers --
who, that is, clearly meet the central requirement of liberalism -- and would therefore deserve a
form of institutionalized protection from murder, torture and enslavement. For nonhuman animals
are quintessentially silent: not being able to speak out for themselves, they haven't as yet found any
group influential enough to effectively claim their rights.
If, however, liberal reason finally gets rid of the shadow of Hobbesian self-interest -- if, that is, it
comes to recognize that by its implicit reference to power it artificially restricts the expansive force
of impartiality42 -- even silent parties will finally make their way to a fair coexistence with us in
our societies. At least as far as the status of nonhumans is concerned, some signs of a shift are
already detectable.43 It is plausible to claim that only if such a process continues will liberalism free
itself of any form of substantivity, actually achieving its self-proclaimed formal -- that is,
procedural, neutral, and analytic -- nature.44
Paola Cavalieri
Editor of the international philosophy journal Etica & Animali
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